Fundamental Limits of Covert Packet Insertion by Soltani, Ramin et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS 1
Fundamental Limits of Covert Packet Insertion
Ramin Soltani∗, Dennis Goeckel∗, Don Towsley†, and Amir Houmansadr†
∗Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
{soltani, goeckel}@ecs.umass.edu
†College of Information and Computer Sciences, University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
{towsley, amir}@cs.umass.edu
Abstract
Covert communication conceals the existence of the transmission from a watchful adversary. We consider the
fundamental limits for covert communications via packet insertion over packet channels whose packet timings
are governed by a renewal process of rate λ. Authorized transmitter Jack sends packets to authorized receiver
Steve, and covert transmitter Alice wishes to transmit packets to covert receiver Bob without being detected by
watchful adversary Willie. Willie cannot authenticate the source of the packets. Hence, he looks for statistical
anomalies in the packet stream from Jack to Steve to attempt detection of unauthorized packet insertion. First,
we consider a special case where the packet timings are governed by a Poisson process and we show that Alice
can covertly insert O(√λT ) packets for Bob in a time interval of length T ; conversely, if Alice inserts ω(√λT ),
she will be detected by Willie with high probability. Then, we extend our results to general renewal channels
and show that in a stream of N packets transmitted by Jack, Alice can covertly insert O(√N) packets; if she
inserts ω(
√
N) packets, she will be detected by Willie with high probability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
PRIVACY and security have become crucial issues in daily life as the use of communicationsystems has increased (e.g. telephone, email, social media) [?], [3]–[6]. Information theoretic
secrecy [7] and encryption [8] protect the secrecy of message contents; however, these techniques do
not satisfy the security and privacy requirements of users in many scenarios. Recently, the need for
another level of secrecy was highlighted by the Snowden disclosures [9]: users of a communication
system often need not only secrecy for the contents of their messages, but also for hiding the existence
of their communication. As a solution, covert communication ensures that a watchful adversary is not
able to detect whether communication is taking place or not. Two applications of covert communication
are the removal of the ability to track daily user activities and to hide the presence of military activities.
Steganography [10] is utilized to covertly embed information into an overt message on a digital (and
typically noiseless) channels. Alternatively, spread spectrum methods [11] provide covert communi-
cation on noisy channels. Information-theoretic limits of covert communications only recently gained
attention first with the study of additive white Gaussian (AWGN) channels [12], [13], which was later
extended to provide a comprehensive characterization of the limits of covert communication over discrete
memoryless channels (DMCs), optical channels, and AWGN channels [14]–[26].
In this paper, we extend the work in [14]–[26] to packet processes typical of wired computer networks.
In computer networks, covert channels can be divided into two major categories [27]: covert storage
channels and covert timing channels. A covert storage channel involves the writing of a shared storage
location by one process and reading of it by another; e.g. modifying headers of packets [28]–[31].
Alternatively, a covert timing channel involves the exchange of information between two users by
manipulation of timings of some shared resources; e.g. embedding information packet timings first
explored by Girling [32] and later studied by many others [33]–[41]. This includes applications of
covert channels in TCP/IP! [31], [42], [43], VoIP [44], LTE-A [45], BitTorrent [46], and establishment
of a covert communication over IPV4 [33], [47] and IPV6 [48] have been studied.
Considerable work has focused on detection of covert channels [34], [49], [49]–[54] as well as eluding
detection by leveraging the statistical properties of the legitimate channel [55]. Moreover, significant
research has been performed on quantifying and optimizing the capacity of covert channels [34], [42],
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[56]–[62] by leveraging information-theoretic analysis and the use of various coding techniques [40],
[63], [64]. In particular, Anantharam and Verdu [65] derived the Shannon capacity of the timing channel
with a single-server queue, and Dunn [66] analyzed the secrecy capacity of such a system.
Per above, here we take a fundamental approach analogous to [12]–[23], but turn our attention to covert
communication over wired channels in which communication takes place through packet transmissions.
Specifically, we consider the scenario shown in Fig. 1. Authorized transmitter Jack sends packets to
authorized receiver Steve. Assume that Alice wishes to transmit data covertly to Bob on this channel
in the presence of an adversary, Willie, who is monitoring the channel. Willie can be in one of the two
locations, either between Alice and Bob (Setting 1), or between Bob and Steve (Setting 2). Alice and
Bob know that Willie is located at one or the other of these two places; however, they do not know
which place he is located at. We assume Willie cannot authenticate the source of the packets (e.g.,
whether they are sent by Jack or not). However, he knows the statistical model of the timings of the
packets transmitted by Jack. Alice can buffer and release Jack’s packets and insert her own packets.
Also, Bob can authenticate packets, remove the ones originally inserted by Alice, and buffer and release
Jack’s packets. We assume Alice can only send information to Bob by inserting her own packets into
the channel, since she is not allowed to share a secret codebook with Bob and thus she is not able to
send covert messages to Bob via packet timings; i.e., altering the timing of the packets according to
a shared codebook, to embed information in inter-packet delays (IPDs) [65]. In addition, transmission
of information through packet timings is sensitive to natural network noise and thus is not applicable
in scenarios where timing noise alters the transmitted packet timings (codeword) such that the receiver
is not able to decode the message with the required decoding error (e.g. complex channels where the
packet streams are first mixed and then separated). We answer this question: how many packets can
Alice transmit to Bob without being detected by Willie?
We consider two statistical models for the timing process of Jack’s transmitted packets. First, we
analyze a Poisson channel (Assumption 1) [1]; i.e., IPDs of Jack’s transmitted stream are modeled
by independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random variables with mean λ−1, and
Willie is aware of this. Therefore, Willie seeks to verify whether the packet process has the proper
characteristics. We exploit the fact that the superposition of two independent Poisson processes is a
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Poisson process: Alice generates a Poisson process of low enough rate and uses it to govern the times
at which she inserts the covert packets into the Jack-to-Steve channel. We assume Willie is aware of
Alice’s transmission strategy (insertion scheme, rate, etc.) as well as what Bob can do, if they choose
to communicate with each other.
Covertness as defined formally in Section II requires that Willie’s decision on whether Alice transmits
or not be arbitrarily close to random guessing. In Theorem 1, we show that Alice can transmit O
(√
λT
)
packets covertly to Bob in a time interval of length T . Conversely, we prove that if Alice transmits
ω
(√
λT
)
packets during a time interval of length T , she will be detected by Willie with high probability.
Next, we extend the Poisson channel to a renewal channel [2] (Assumption 2), where the timings of
Jack’s transmitted packets are modeled by a renewal process; i.e., IPDs of Jack’s transmitted stream
are modeled by i.i.d. random variables with probability density function (pdf) p(x) and transmission
rate λ =
(∫∞
x=0
xp(x)dx
)−1 packets per second, and Willie is aware of these characteristics. Therefore,
Willie seeks to verify whether the packet process has the proper properties. Since the superposition of
two independent renewal processes is a not generally a renewal process, we use a technique different
from the one employed in the Poisson channel.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model and
definitions employed. We provide constructions and their analysis for the Poisson channel in Section III,
and we analyze the renewal channel in Section IV. Section V contains the discussion of the results, and
Section VII summarizes our results.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, Jack transmits packets to Steve while a watchful warden Willie observes the packet
flow from his vantage point. Willie does not have access to the contents of the packets and therefore
cannot authenticate whether a packet is originally transmitted by Jack, or generated and inserted by
Alice. Instead, based on the timings of the packets, Willie attempts to discern any irregularities that
might indicate that someone is inserting packets into the channel. Alice’s goal is to insert her own
packets in the stream of the packets sent by Jack so as to communicate covertly with Bob. Willie’s
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(a) Setting 1
(b) Setting 2
Fig. 1: System configuration: Authorized transmitter Jack sends packets to authorized receiver Steve, and covert transmitter
Alice uses the same channel to send her own packets to Bob without being detected by warden Willie, who cannot authenticate
the source of the packets. Willie is aware of the statistical model of the timing of the packets sent by Jack. Willie can be in
one of the two locations: (a) Setting 1: between Alice and Bob; or (b) Setting 2: between Bob and Steve. Willie’s location
(i.e. the setting) is not known to Alice or Bob.
location is fixed; he is either between Alice and Bob (Setting 1 shown in Fig. 1a), or he is between
Bob and Steve (Setting 2 shown in Fig. 1b), and Alice and Bob are unaware of his location.
Alice communicates with Bob by sending her packets into the channel, but Alice and Bob do not share
a secret, thus preventing the distribution of a secret codebook to communicate via packet timings [1],
[2], [65]. Alice can also buffer and release Jack’s transmitted packets. Bob can authenticate, receive
and remove packets originally inserted by another party. He is also allowed to buffer and release Jack’s
transmitted packets. We assume Willie knows the characteristics of Alice’s potential insertion scheme
(rate, method of insertion, etc.) and Bob’s capabilities. We denote the IPDs of the packets departing
March 29, 2019 DRAFT
6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
Jack, Alice, and Bob by {A(J)1 , A(J)2 , . . .}, {A(A)1 , A(A)2 , . . .}, and {A(B)1 , A(B)2 , . . .}, respectively.
We consider two sets of assumptions regarding the timing process of Jack’s packets:
Assumption 1 (Poisson channel model) Transmission times for the packets generated by Jack are
modeled by a Poisson process with parameter λ; i.e., IPDs of Jack’s transmitted stream are i.i.d. random
variables with pdf p(x) = λe−λx, and Jack’s packet transmission rate λ is known to both Alice and
Willie.
Assumption 2 (Renewal channel model): Transmission times of the packets transmitted by Jack are
modeled by a renewal process; i.e., IPDs of Jack’s transmitted stream are positive i.i.d. random variables
with pdf p(x) and Jack’s transmission rate is λ =
(∫∞
0
xp(x)dx
)−1. Both Willie and Alice know p(x)
and λ.
When IPDs A1, A2, . . . are samples of f(x) and modeled by a renewal process, the arrival times are
τf (1), τf (2), . . ., where
τf (i) =
i∑
j=1
Aj, (1)
and the total number of arrivals within the interval [0, t] is Xf (t) = sup {i : τf (i) ≤ t}. Observe:
{τf (i) ≤ t} = {Xf (t) ≥ i}. (2)
For a Poisson process, (f(x) = λe−λx), we omit the subscripts of τf (i) and Xf (t).
B. Definitions
Willie is faced with a binary hypothesis test: the null hypothesis H0 corresponds to the case that
Alice does not transmit, and the alternative hypothesis H1 corresponds to the case that Alice transmits.
We denote the distributions of IPDs that Willie observes by P1 and P0 under H1 and H0, respectively.
We denote by PFA the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true (type I error or false alarm), and
PMD the probability of rejecting H1 when it is true (type II error or missed detection). Willie uses
classical hypothesis testing and seeks to minimize PFA + PMD.
Similar to the definition of covertness in [1], [2], [16]–[18], [67], [68], and invisibility in [69], [70],
we define covertness:
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Definition 1. (Covertness) Alice and Bob’s communication is covert, if and only if Willie’s sum of
probabilities of error PFA + PMD is lower bounded by 1−  for any  > 0 [13], for Willie in each of
his possible locations.
We present results under the assumption that P(H0) = P(H1) = 1/2. However, this results in
covertness for the general case [71, Appendix A].
We use standard “Big O”,“Little Omega”, and “Big Theta” notations [72].
III. POISSON CHANNELS (ASSUMPTION 1)
In this section, we consider the fundamental limits of covert packet insertion for the Poisson channel
(Assumption 1). As evident from the proof, the possibility that Willie is located after Bob (Setting 2) is
trivially addressed under Assumption 1. We will see this is not the case for the renewal channel model
considered in Section IV.
Theorem 1. In a Poisson channel with rate λ, Alice can covertly insert insert O(√λT ) packets in a
time interval of length T . Conversely, if Alice attempts to insert ω
(√
λT
)
packets in a time interval
of length T , there exists a detector that Willie can use to detect her with arbitrarily low sum of error
probabilities PFA + PMD.
Proof: (Achievability)
Construction: Alice generates a Poisson process with parameter ∆ independent of the timings of
Jack’s packets and, at each point of the process, inserts her own packet into the channel between Jack
and Steve. Bob collects and removes the packets inserted by Alice.
Analysis: (Covertness) First, for each of the two possible locations of Willie, we show that commu-
nication is covert. Next, we calculate the number of covert packets transmitted by Alice.
(Setting 1-Willie is between Alice and Bob, as show in Fig. 1a): Willie observes the packets on the
channel between Alice and Bob and decides whether Alice has inserted packets intended for Bob (H1) or
not (H0). Note that H1 and H1 correspond to Poisson processes with rates λ+∆ and λ respectively. By
the Neyman-Pearson lemma [73, Ch. 3.2 and 13.1], an optimal hypothesis test that minimizes the sum
of error probabilities is the likelihood ratio (LRT) between the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative
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hypothesis H1 is given by [74, Ch. 3.5.2]:
Λ(n) =
PN1(n)
PN0(n)
, (3)
where n is the number of packets that Willie observes in [0, T ], PN0(n) = P(N0 = n) is the probability
mass function (pmf) of the number of packets N0 that Willie observes under the null hypothesis H0
corresponding to a Poisson process with rate λ, and PN1(n) = P(N1 = n) is the pmf for the number
of packets N1 that Willie observes under hypothesis H1 corresponding to a Poisson process with rate
λ+ ∆. Suppose Alice sets
∆ ≤ 
√
2λ
T
. (4)
By (3), we can see that the number of packets observed during the time interval of length T is a
sufficient statistic by which Willie can perform the optimal hypothesis test to decide whether Alice
transmits or not. For any test on the number of packets during time T [13],
PFA + PMD ≥ 1−
√
1
2
D(PN0||PN1). (5)
where D(PN0||PN1) is the relative entropy between PN0 and PN1 . Next, we show how Alice can lower
bound the sum of average error probabilities by upper bounding
√
1
2
D(PN0||PN1). For the given PN0
and PN1 the relative entropy is [75]
D(PN0||PN1) = ∆ · T − λT ln
(
1 +
∆
λ
)
≤ ∆
2
2λ
T ≤ 22.
where the second to last step is true because ln(1 + x) ≥ x− x2
2
for x ≥ 0, and the last step is due to
the definition of ∆ given in (4). Consequently,
√
1
2
D(PN0||PN1) ≤ , and thusPFA + PMD ≥ 1−  for
∆ = O
(√
λ/T
)
.
(Setting 2-Willie is between Bob and Steve, as show in Fig. 1b): Willie observes the packets transmitted
by Bob. Since Alice inserts her own packets independent of the channel, her insertion does not change
the timing of Jack’s packets. Since Bob removes Alice’s inserted packets, Willie observes the original
timings of the packets transmitted by Jack, and thus Alice and Bob’s communication is covert.
(Number of Covert Packets) Alice inserts packets according to a Poisson process with rate ∆. Let
τ(i) denote the time that Alice inserts the ith packet, and Na denote the number of packets inserted by
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Alice. We focus on P (Na ≥ i). By (2),
P
(
Na ≥ 
√
λT
)
= P
(
τ
(

√
λT
)
≤ T
)
= P
√λT∑
k=1
Ai ≤ T
 ,
where the Ais are i.i.d. exponentially distributed IPDs with mean ∆−1 = 1
√
T
2λ
, which goes to infinity
as T →∞. We introduce A′i =
√
TAi; A′1, A
′
2, . . . is a sequence of i.i.d. exponential random variables
with finite mean (∆
√
T )−1 = 1/
√
2λ and variance 1/2λ2. Consider
lim
T→∞
P
(
Na ≥ 
√
λT
)
= lim
T→∞
P
√λT∑
k=1
A′i ≤
√
T
 = lim
T→∞
P
√λT∑
k=1
A′i

√
λT
≤
√
T

√
λT
 ,
= lim
T→∞
P
√λT∑
k=1
A′i

√
λT
≤
√
2E[A′i]
 = 1, (6)
where the last step follows from the weak law of large numbers (WLLN) which yields
∑√λT
k=1
A′i

√
λT
P−→
E[A′i]. By (6), P
(
Na ≥ d
√
λT
)
→ 1, as T → ∞, for all d ≤ . Consequently, Alice can insert
Na = O
(√
λT
)
packets covertly.
(Converse) To establish the converse, we provide an explicit detector for Willie that is sufficient to limit
Alice’s throughput across all potential transmission schemes (i.e., not necessarily insertion according
to a Poisson process). Suppose that Willie observes a time interval of length T and wishes to detect
whether Alice transmits or not. Since he knows that the packet arrival process for the link between
Jack and Steve is a Poisson process with parameter λ, he knows the expected number of packets in an
interval [0, T ]. Therefore, he counts the number of packets S in this interval and performs a hypothesis
test by setting a threshold U and compares S to λT +U . If S ≤ λT +U , Willie decides H0; otherwise,
he decides H1. Consider PFA,
PFA = P
(
S > λT + U
∣∣∣H0) = P(S − λT > U ∣∣∣H0) ≤ P(|S − λT | > U ∣∣∣H0) . (7)
When H0 is true, Willie observes a Poisson process with parameter λ; hence,
E
[
S
∣∣∣H0] = λT,
Var
[
S
∣∣∣H0] = λT .
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Therefore, applying Chebyshev’s inequality on (7) yields PFA ≤ λTU2 . Thus, ∀0 < α < 1, if Willie sets
U =
√
λT
α
, he can achieve
PFA ≤ α.
Next, we will show that if Alice inserts ω
(√
λT
)
packets, she will be detected by Willie with high
probability. Consider PMD:
PMD = P
(
S ≤ λT + U
∣∣∣∣H1) = P(S ≤ λT +√λT/α∣∣∣∣H1) = P(Na +Nj ≤ λT +√λT/α) , (8)
= P
(
Nj ≤ λT +
√
λT/α−Na
)
,
where Na is the number of packets inserted by Alice and Nj is the number of packets inserted by Jack.
We show in the Appendix A that for all β > 0,
lim
T→∞
PMD < β. (9)
Since α and β are arbitrary, PFA + PMD is arbitrarily small whenever Na = ω(
√
λT ).
IV. RENEWAL CHANNELS (ASSUMPTION 2)
The packet arrival processes measured in many networks demonstrate non-Poisson behavior. Hence,
in this section, we extend our results from Section III to the general renewal channel. Per Section II,
we assume that the IPDs of Jack’s transmitted stream are i.i.d. with pdf p(x); thus, Jack’s transmission
rate is λ =
(∫∞
0
xp(x)dx
)−1.
For Poisson channels, we took advantage of the fact that the superposition of two independent Poisson
processes is a Poisson process. However, the superposition of two independent renewal processes is not
necessarily a renewal process. Therefore, if Alice inserts her packets in the channel according to a
renewal process, since the packet timings that Willie observes under H1 (P1) is not a necessarily a
renewal process, the derivation of P1 and the calculation of the relative entropy between P1 and P0,
which is required in the covertness analysis becomes challenging. Note that there is no special class
of renewal processes (except Poisson processes) that makes the calculation easier; if the superposition
of two ordinary renewal processes is an ordinary renewal process, then those processes are either
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Poisson [76], [77] or binomial-like processes [77], which are not applicable to our scenarios. Therefore,
we employ an alternative technique for Alice’s insertion of packets.
In [2], we employed the following technique: Alice and Bob employ a two-phase scheme. In the
first phase, Alice (slightly) slows down the packet stream to buffer packets. In the second phase, she
generates a renewal process with a rate higher than Jack’s transmission rate. For each packet transmission
during the second phase, Alice flips an unfair coin to decide whether to send one of her packets or
one of Jack’s packets. Although this technique is reasonable and its covertness analysis is accurate, the
reliability analysis in [2] relied on the approximation that a regular random walk can model Alice’s
buffer length in the second phase, which is not strictly true. Besides, it did not allow for the case where
Willie is between Bob and Steve (Setting 2) in the covertness analysis. We can employ [78, Theorem
9.1] which is also mentioned in [79, Theorem 4] to relax the approximation in the reliability analysis.
Here, we introduce another strategy that allows for accurate analysis. Alice and Bob employ a two-
phase scheme. In the first phase, Bob transmits Jack’s packets at a rate (slightly) smaller than Jack’s
packet rate λ so as to build up a backlog of Nb = O(
√
N) packets in his buffer. In this phase, Alice
remains idle except for calculating Nb by simulating Bob’s buffering process. In the second phase, Alice
replaces Nb of Jack’s packets with packets of her own and Bob replaces Alice’s inserted packets with
packets in his buffer. The second phase ends when the total number of (Alice’s and Jack’s) packets
transmitted by Alice is N .
In Lemma 1, we derive the number of packets that Bob can buffer when the total number of packets
that Bob transmits is N . Consider p−(x, ρ1) = (1 − ρ1)p ((1− ρ1)x) which is the scaled version of
p(x), where 0 < ρ1 < 1. Since
∫∞
x=0
xp−(x, ρ1)dx = 11−ρ1
∫∞
x=0
xp(x)dx, the renewal processes whose
inter-arrival timings are governed by p−(x, ρ1) has a smaller rate than that of p(x). Lemma 1 requires
that p−(x, ρ1) satisfies the following conditions [80, Ch. 2.6] which are mentioned in [81, Theorem 1]
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as regularity conditions for maximum likelihood estimators with f(x|ρ1) = p−(x, ρ1):
•∂ log p
−
∂ρ1
,
∂2 log p−
∂ρ21
,
∂3 log p−
∂ρ31
exist, ∀ρ1 ∈ (0, 1) (10)
•∀ρ1 ∈ (0, 1),
∣∣∣∣∂p−∂ρ1
∣∣∣∣ < F (x), s.t. ∫ ∞
x=0
F (x)dx <∞,∣∣∣∣∂2p−∂ρ21
∣∣∣∣ < G(x), s.t. ∫ ∞
x=0
G(x)dx <∞∣∣∣∣∂3 log p−∂ρ31
∣∣∣∣ < H(x), s.t. ∫ ∞
x=0
p(x)H(x)dx < ξ <∞ where ξ is independent of ρ1 (11)
•
∫ ∞
x=0
∂p−(x, ρ1)
∂ρ1
∣∣∣∣
ρ1=0
dx =
∫ ∞
x=0
∂2p−(x, ρ1)
∂ρ21
∣∣∣∣
ρ1=0
dx = 0 (12)
Among the probability distributions that satisfy conditions (10)-(12) are the generalized gamma dis-
tribution and its special cases: exponential distribution, Chi-squared distribution, Rayleigh distribution,
Weibull distribution, Gamma distribution, and Erlang distribution.
We require that the support of p(x) be R+ because 1) IPDs are positive; and 2) among the distributions
with non-negative support, conditions (10)-(12) do not satisfy for the distributions whose support is not
R+, such as Pareto distribution, uniform distribution, and Beta distribution. Intuitively, the latter is
required since Bob scales up the pdf of IPDs to p−(x, ρ) = (1 − ρ1)p(x(1 − ρ1)) where 0 < ρ1 < 1
is defined later. If the support of p(x) is not [0,∞), then with high probability, the new pdf of the
inter-packet delays p−(x, ρ) produces an IPD that does not fall in the support of p(x). Hence, Willie
will observe an inter-packet delay that cannot be generated from p(x), and thus Willie detects Bob’s
buffering.
Lemma 1. Under the conditions given above for [81, Theorem 1] for the renewal process characterizing
the packet timings on the link from Jack to Steve, Bob can covertly buffer O(√N) packets while
transmitting N of Jack’s packets, as long as p−(x, ρ1) = (1 − ρ1)p ((1− ρ1)x) satisfies conditions
(10)-(12). Conversely, if Bob buffers ω(
√
N) packets while receiving N of Jack’s packets, there exists
a detector that Willie can use to detect such a buffering with arbitrarily low sum of error probabilities
PFA + PMD.
Proof: (Achievability)
Construction: Since Alice does not insert any packets and she only relays Jack’s packets, Bob receives
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Fig. 2: a) Bob’s received process b) The scaled version of Bob’s received process when Bob uses a factor 11−ρ1 .
Jack’s packet stream. In this lemma, the term “packet” will refer to Jack’s packets. For a fixed number
of packets N , Bob scales up the IPDs by 1
1−ρ1 where 0 < ρ1 < 1, i.e, if he receives the i
th packet at
τp(i), he sends it at time
τp(i)
1−ρ1 , as shown in Fig. 2.
First, we show that Bob can buffer O(√N) packets, then we demonstrate covertness, and finally in
the converse case we show that Bob cannot buffer ω(
√
N) packets covertly.
Analysis: (Number of Buffered Packets) Bob sets
ρ1 =
√
cN
,
where 0 <  < 1 and c > 0 is a constant defined later. Note that the first phase ends at time T0 :=
τp(N)
1−ρ1
when Bob transmits the N th packet. From t = 0 to t = T0, if Bob receives a packet of jack at time τ ,
he transmits it at time τ
1−ρ1 . Let Xp(t) be the total number of packets received from Jack within the
interval [0, t], and τp(i) be the time of arrival of the ith packet from Jack. The total number of packets
that Bob receives from Jack and the total number of packets that Bob buffers are Xp
(
τp(N)
1−ρ1
)
and
m = Xp
(
τp (N)
1− ρ1
)
−N,
respectively. We show in Appendices B and C, respectively, that
lim
N→∞
P
(
m ≥ 
√
N
4c
)
= 1, (13)
lim
N→∞
P
(
m ≤ 
√
4N
c
)
= 1. (14)
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By (13), for all d ≤ 
√
1
4c
, P
(
m ≥ d√N
)
→ 1, as N →∞. Therefore, Bob buffers O(√N) packets
when he transmits N of Jack’s packets.
(Covertness) Now, we show that Bob’s buffering is covert. If Willie is between Alice and Bob (Setting
1), he will not observe any changes in packet timings due to Bob’s buffering, and thus the covertness
follows immediately. Therefore, we present the analysis for the case where Willie is between Bob and
Steve (Setting 2). We assume Willie knows the number of packets N being slowed down and the scaling
factor 1 − ρ1 that Bob has possibly used. Upon observing the first N packets, Willie decides whether
Bob has not modified the packet timings (H0), or he has slowed down those N packets (H1). If Willie
applies an optimal hypothesis test that minimizes PFA + PMD on the IPDs, then arguments similar to
those leading to (5) yield:
PFA + PMD ≥ 1−
√
1
2
D(P0||P1), (15)
where:
P0 =
N∏
i=1
p(xi),
P1 =
N∏
i=1
p−(xi, ρ1).
Therefore,
D(P0||P1) = ND
(
p(x)||p−(x, ρ1)
)
. (16)
Since the regulatory conditions (10-12) hold, [80, Ch. 2.6] yields:
D (p(x)||p−(x, ρ1)) = cρ21
2
+O (ρ31) as ρ1 → 0, (17)
where c is a positive constant derived in Appendix D,
c = −1 +
∫ ∞
x=0
p(x)x2
(
d log p(x)
dx
)2
dx. (18)
Note that c depends on p(x). By (16) and (17),
D(P0||P1) = N
(
cρ21
2
+O (ρ31)) as ρ1 → 0.
Because ρ1 = √cN , limN→∞
√
1
2
D(P0||P1) = limN→∞ 
√
N
4N
< . Thus, by (15), PFA + PMD≥ 1 − 
as N →∞ and Bob covertly buffers O(√N) packets when he transmits N of Jack’s packets.
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(Converse) Since Willie knows p(x), he knows the expected sum of the IPDs of N packets. Therefore,
he calculates the average observed IPD S and performs a hypothesis test by setting a threshold U and
comparing S with λ−1 + U . If S ≤ λ−1 + U , he decides H0; otherwise, he decides H1. Observe
PFA = P
(
S > λ−1 + U
∣∣∣∣H0) = P(S − λ−1 > U ∣∣∣∣H0) ≤ P(|S − λ−1| > U ∣∣∣∣H0) . (19)
When H0 is true, Willie observes a renewal process with rate λ, with variance σ2; hence,
E
[
S
∣∣∣H0] = λ−1,
Var
[
S
∣∣∣H0] = σ2
N
.
Therefore, applying Chebyshev’s inequality on (19) yields PFA ≤ σ2NU2 . Therefore, if Willie sets U =√
σ2
αN
, for any 0 < α < 1, he achieves PFA ≤ α.
Next, we will show that if Bob buffers m = ω(
√
N) packets, he will be detected by Willie with high
probability.
When Bob buffers packets, he will transmit N packets during the time that Jack transmits N + m
packets. Therefore, τp(N +m) ≤ SN < τp(N +m+ 1). Now, let us consider PMD. When H1 is true,
SN ≥ τp(N +m). Thus:
PMD = P
(
S ≤ λ−1 + U
∣∣∣∣H1) = P(S ≤ λ−1 + U ∣∣∣∣S ≥ τp(N +m)N
)
,
= P
(
τp(N +m)
N
≤ S ≤ λ−1 + U
∣∣∣∣S ≥ τp(N +m)N
)
,
≤ P
(
τp(N +m)
N
≤ λ−1 + U
∣∣∣∣S ≥ τp(N +m)N
)
,
= P
(
τp(N +m)
N
≤ λ−1 + U
)
,
= P
(
τp(N +m)
N +m
≤ λ−1 − λ−1 m+ 1
N +m
+
NU
N +m
)
.
Note that τp(N+m) is the sum of N+m i.i.d. random variables with mean λ−1 and variance σ2. There-
fore, the central limit theorem (CLT) yields
√
N +m
(
τp(N+m)
N+m
− λ−1
)
D−→ Y , where Y ∼ N (0, σ2) is
a Gaussian random variable with mean zero and variance σ2. Therefore, as N →∞,
PMD ≤ P
(
Y ≤ −λ−1 m+ 1√
N +m
+
NU√
N +m
)
= P
(
Y ≤ −λ−1 m+ 1√
N +m
+
√
N
N +m
√
σ2
α
)
, (20)
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where (20) is true since U =
√
σ2
αN
. Thus, if m = ω(
√
N) then lim
N→∞
PMD = 0. Combined with the
results for the probability of false alarm above, if Bob collects m = ω
(√
N
)
packets, Willie can choose
a U =
√
σ2
Nα
to achieve any (small) α > 0 and β > 0 desired.
Next, we leverage the results of Lemma 1 to present and prove the results for packet insertion on
a renewal channel. Although Alice and Bob do not know the actual location of Willie, their strategy
guarantees covertness irrespective of Willie’s location. Then, we conclude that if he analyzes the whole
stream of packets transmitted by Alice, the communication is covert.
Theorem 2. In a renewal channel whose IPDs have p(x), with conditions (10-12) true, Alice can
covertly insert O(√N) packets in a packet stream of length N . Conversely, if Alice attempts to insert
ω(
√
N) packets in a packet stream of length N , there exists a detector that Willie can use to detect her
with arbitrarily low sum of error probabilities PFA + PMD.
Proof: (Achievability)
Construction: Alice and Bob employ a two-phase scheme. During the buffering phase, Alice is idle
but Bob slows down Jack’s packets to build up packets in his buffer, i.e., if he receives a packet at time
τ , he transmits it at time τ
1−ρ2 where
ρ2 = 
√
1
cNψ
, (21)
and ψ is any constant that satisfies 0 < ψ < 1. The first phase ends when Bob transmits the bψNcth
packet of Jack. From Lemma 1, Bob can buffer Nb = O
(√
N
)
packets covertly. Alice knows Bob’s
buffering process because she knows the timings of packets transmitted by Jack and ρ2; thus, she
calculates the number Nb of packets buffered by Bob. In the second phase, Alice replaces Nb of Jack’s
packets with packets of her own, and Bob replaces Alice’s packets by Jack’s packets in his buffer. Alice
and Bob do this without changing the order of Jack’s packets. Furthermore, Bob delays each packet in
the second phase for φ seconds, where φ is the time elapsed between the moment that Bob receives
the last packet in the first phase until the end of the first phase. We will later explain how this delay
makes the pdf of Bob’s first IPD in the second phase equal to p(x).
Since Willie cannot verify the source of the packets, Alice can choose any subset of size Nb of packets
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transmitted by Jack in the second phase to replace them with her own packets. Here, we propose a
scheme where the locations of Alice packets are random. To decide whether to replace a packet, she uses
a Bernoulli decision, i.e., each time she receives a packet from Jack, first she generates a random variable
according to a Bernoulli distribution with P (Success) = ρ3 = 2NbN(1−ψ) . If she observes “Success”, she
replaces the packet; otherwise, she does not. She stops when she replaces the N thb packet. The second
phase ends when the total number of (Alice’s and Jack’s) packets transmitted by Alice is N . At the
end of the second phase, Alice will have Nb of Jack’s packets in her buffer. After the transmission,
Alice and Bob will relay Jack’s packets. Alice transmits Jack’s oldest packet in her buffer and stores
the newly received pack to keep the packets transmitted by Jack in order, and Bob, whose buffer is
empty, forwards Jack’s packets.
Analysis: (Covertness) First, for each of the two possible locations of Willie, we show that commu-
nication is covert. Next, we calculate the number of covert packets transmitted by Alice.
(Setting 1-Willie is between Alice and Bob, as show in Fig. 1a ): Since Alice does not change packet
timings and Willie is between Alice and Bob, Willie observes the original packet timings transmitted
by Jack and covertness follows immediately.
(Setting 2-Willie is between Bob and Steve, as show in Fig. 1b): Recall that Willie knows Alice and
Bob’s transmission scheme and parameters, the time they start and end each phase, and the scaling factor
1 − ρ2 that Bob has used. We first assume Willie analyzes the packets in the two phases separately
and show that the communication is covert. Then, we conclude that if he analyzes the whole stream of
packets transmitted by Bob together, the communication is covert.
In the first phase, Bob slows down packets from Jack to buffer packets until he transmits packet
bψNc of Jack. By Lemma 1, Bob buffers Nb = O(
√
N) packets, while for all ,
lim
N→∞
D
(
P(1)0 ||P(1)1
)
≤ 22,
P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD ≥ 1− .
where P(1)0 and P
(1)
1 are joint pdfs of the IPDs in the first phase, when H0 and H1 are true respectively,
and P(1)FA and P
(1)
MD are the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true and the probability of rejecting
H1 when it is true, respectively in the first phase. Thus, Bob’s buffering is covert.
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Fig. 3: a) Bob’s packet arrival times b) Bob’s packet departure times without delaying packets φ seconds in the second
phase c) Bob’s packet departure times with delaying packets φ seconds in the second phase.
Next, we show that Willie observes Jack’s original IPDs in the second phase. When the first phase
ends Bob has buffered m packets, transmitted bNψc packets, and received bNψc + m packets from
Jack. Recall that in the second phase Bob delays each packet φ seconds, where φ is the time elapsed
between the moment that Bob receives the last packet in the first phase (t = τp(bψNc+ m)) until the
end of the first phase (t = τpbNψc
1−ρ1 ), i.e., φ =
τpbNψc
1−ρ1 − τp(bψNc + m). Denote by θ the time elapsed
between end of the first phase (t = τpbNψc
1−ρ1 ) and the moment that Bob receives the first packet in the
second phase (t = τp(bψNc+m+ 1)), i.e.,
θ = τp(bNψc+m+ 1)− τp(bNψc)
1− ρ1 .
Since Bob delays the packets in the second phase φ seconds, Bob’s first IPD in the second phase will
be
φ+ θ = τp(bNψc+m+ 1)− τp(bNψc+m),
which is Jack’s original {bNψc+m+ 1}th IPD, and thus has the pdf p(x) (see Fig 3). Since all other
IPDs in the second phase are also Jack’s original IPDs, Willie observes the original IPDs transmitted
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by Jack and thus the covertness follows immediately for the second phase. Denote by P(2)0 and P
(2)
1 the
joint pdfs of the IPDs in the second phase, when H0 and H1 are true, respectively, and by P(2)FA and
P(2)MD the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true and the probability of rejecting H1 when it is true,
respectively, in the second phase. Thus,
lim
N→∞
D(P(2)0 ||P(2)1 ) = 0,
P(2)FA + P
(2)
MD > 1− . (22)
Combined with the results of covertness for the first phase, if Willie analyzes the two sequences of
packets in the first and second phase separately, the communication is covert, i.e., his sum of error
probabilities in each phase is upper bounded by 1−  for all .
Now assume that Willie analyzes the entire sequence of packets from the first and second phase
together. Since P0 = P(1)0 P
(2)
0 and P1 = P
(1)
1 P
(2)
1 ,
D (P0||P1) = D
(
P(1)0 ||P(1)1
)
+D
(
P(2)0 ||P(2)1
)
≤ ′2.
Consequently, Alice can achieve PFA + PMD ≥ 1− ′ for all ′.
(Number of Packets) Recall that the first phase ends when Bob transmits the bψNcth packet of Jack.
Thus, replacing N with bψNc in (13) and (14) yields P
(
Nb ≥ 
√
bψNc
4c
)
→ 1 and P
(
Nb ≤ 
√
4bψNc
c
)
→
1, respectively, as N →∞. Recall that c > 0 is given in (18). Since P
(
Nb ≥ d
√
4bψNc
c
)
→ 1 for all
d ≤ , Alice can insert O(√N) packets in a packet stream of length N .
(Converse) The argument follows analogously to that of the converse in Lemma 1. Suppose that Willie
observes R = N + Na packets and wishes to detect whether Alice has done nothing over the channel
(H0) or she has inserted Na packets. He calculates average observed IPD S and sets a threshold U ; if
S ≥ λ−1 +U , he decides H0; otherwise, he decides H1. We can show that if Willie sets U =
√
σ2
αR
, for
any 0 < α < 1, he achieves PFA ≤ α. Willie knows that if Alice chooses to insert packets, she will use
the time of transmission of N packets from Jack to do so. Therefore, if H1 is true, then SR ≤ τp(N).
Using this we can show that if Alice inserts Na = ω(
√
N) packets, then lim
N→∞
PMD = 0. Thus, if Alice
inserts Na = ω(
√
N) packets, Willie can choose a U =
√
σ2
Rα
to achieve any (small) α > 0 and β > 0
desired.
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V. DISCUSSION
A. Alice’s insertion without the buffering phase
In Theorem 2, Alice and Bob use a two-phase scheme. However, we could consider a simpler (one-
phase) scheme. Alice generates a process with a (slightly) higher rate by generating packet transmission
events for the following pdf p+(x, ρ4) =
p(x/(1−ρ4))
1−ρ4 , where
ρ4 =
c′√
N
, (23)
and c′ = √
2c
. Note that ρ4 < 1 for large enough N . Then:
1) She buffers every packet she receives.
2) Every time she generates a packet transmission event, she transmits one of Jack’s packet from
her buffer if one is there; if not, she sends a packet of her own.
Although this scheme does not yield an infinite delay for packets unlike Alice and Bob’s two-phase
scheme in Theorem 2 (see (24)), it does not enable Alice to covertly insert O(√N) packets; in fact,
Alice cannot insert f(N) = ω(1) packets.
Theorem 3. Consider the above scheme. There is no function f(N) = ω(1) such that lim
N→∞
P (Na ≥ f(N)) =
1, where Na is the number of packets that Alice can insert packets intended for Bob in a packet stream
of length N .
See the proof in Appendix E.
B. Packet delays due to buffering
Our scheme requires Bob to slow down the packet stream to buffer packets, which results in packet
delays. According to Lemma 1, since Bob receives the ith packet at τp(i) and he sends it at time
τp(i)
1−ρ1 ,
Bob causes a delay of τp(i)ρ1
1−ρ1 for the i
th packet. The average delay for the N packets transmitted by
Bob goes to ∞ as N →∞ because:
ρ1
1− ρ1
N∑
i=1
E[τp(i)]
N
=
ρ1
1− ρ1
N∑
i=1
i
λ−1
N
=
ρ1
1− ρ1
N + 1
2
λ−1. (24)
Note that each packet is delayed for an amount of time which is proportional to its time of arrival.
According to the proof of Lemma 1, this large delay does not help Willie detect Bob’s actions because
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Willie does not know the original packet timings but instead only knows the statistical properties of
them, which change only slightly.
C. Higher throughput via timing channel and bit insertion
In this paper, Alice is allowed to buffer packets transmitted by Jack and release them when it is
necessary; thus she is able to alter the timings of the packets. This suggests that Alice can also alter
the timings of the packets to send information to Bob [65] to achieve a higher throughput for sending
covert information. However, this would require Alice and Bob to share a secret key (unknown to
adversary Willie) prior to the communication which is not possible in many scenarios. Also, sending
the information through IPDs (timing channel) is sensitive to the noise of the timings and thus not
applicable in channels with a high level of noise in timings, such as complex channels in which multiple
streams of packets are mixed and separated. In addition, a timing channel approach does not work over
channels with zero capacity when packet timing is employed (e.g., deterministic queues). However,
packet insertion works over such channels. Fig. 4 depicts an example.
If we assume Alice and Bob can share a codebook and the altering of timings in the channel can
be modeled by a queue, sending information via packet timing is studied for Poisson packet channels
in [1, Theorem 2] and for renewal channels in [2, Theorem 5].
Another way to communicate covertly on a packet channel is bit insertion, where Alice inserts bits in
a subset of the packets [71]. This technique requires that packets have available space in their payload
and a minimum of one bit in their header. In addition, Alice and Bob need to share a secret prior to
the communication. These conditions can be satisfied only in some scenarios such as video streaming
applications with variable bit rate codecs.
D. Covertness of scaling up/down the IPDs
In Lemma 1, we showed that when Bob scales down the IPDs such that their pdf becomes p−(x, ρ1) =
(1 − ρ1)p ((1− ρ1)x), if conditions (10-12) hold, Bob’s scaling is covert as long as ρ1 = O(1/
√
N).
Similarly, we can show that if he scales up IPDs such that their pdf becomes p+(x, ρ1) = (1 −
ρ1)
−1p (x/ (1− ρ1)), Bob’s scaling is covert as long as ρ1 = O(1/
√
N) and conditions (10-12) hold
when p−(·) is replaced with p+(·).
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Fig. 4: Example of a complex network with high level of timing noise, in which multiple packet streams are mixed and
separated in centers C1, C2, . . . , CK .
E. Packets in Alice’s buffer after the second phase
The construction of Theorems 2 implies that Alice will have O(√N) packets in her buffer at the end
of the second phase. Assuming that Alice will be always on the link, having O(√N) packets in her
buffer does not cause any problems since after Alice and Bob’s communication is done, they will only
relay Jack’s packets. Note that Alice can insert the packets in her buffer into the channel according to the
timings of a Poisson process with a small rate. The covertness analysis of this scheme is challenging
and requires calculating the relative entropy between a renewal process and its superposition with a
Poisson process, which is relegated to future work.
VI. FUTURE WORK
A key goal is to establish the fundamental limits of packet insertion in channels whose packet timings
follow a general point process. We will let Alice insert packets on the channel according to a Poisson
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process with a small rate, independent of the channel. Then, we plan to employ the results of Girsanov’s
theorem to calculate the relative entropy between the point process governing the timings of the packets
on the channel and the superposition of the point processes with a Poisson process. Another future work
is analyzing covert throughout when the packet timings of the channel follow a Poisson process with
a variable rate; in this case, we expect to be able to exploit Willie’s difficulty in estimating the current
packet rate under H0 to allow for the insertion of O(N) packets.
VII. CONCLUSION
We present two scenarios for covert communication on a packet channel. In a Poisson channel where
packet timings are governed by a Poisson process, Alice inserts her own packets into the channel but
does not modify the timing of other packets. We established that Alice can covertly transmit O(√λT )
packets to Bob in a time interval of length T ; conversely, if Alice inserts ω(
√
λT ) packets, she will be
detected by Willie. In a renewal channel where the packet timings are governed by a general renewal
process, we showed that Alice can covertly insert O(√N) packets into the channel in a packet stream of
length N . Conversely, if she inserts ω(
√
N) packets, she will be detected by Willie with high probability.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF (9)
Define A = {Nj +Na ≤ λT +
√
λT/α} and B = Nj < b
√
λT + λT . Employing (8) and the law of
total probability yields:
PMD = P (A) = P(A|B)P(B) + P(A|B)P(B) ≤ P(A|B) + P(B). (25)
Consider the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of (25). Substituting the events A and B yields:
P(A|B) = P
(
Nj +Na ≤ λT +
√
λT/α
∣∣∣∣Nj ≥ b√λT + λT) ,
(a)
≤ P
(
b
√
λT + λT +Na ≤ λT +
√
λT/α
∣∣∣∣Nj ≥ b√λT + λT) ,
= P
(
Na ≤
√
λT/α− b
√
λT
∣∣∣∣Nj ≥ b√λT + λT) = P(Na ≤√λT/α− b√λT ). (26)
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where (a) is true since the condition in the probability is Nj ≥ b
√
λT + λT . If Alice inserts Na =
ω
(√
λT
)
packets, then (26) yields
lim
T→∞
P(A|B) = 0.
Consider the second term on the RHS of (25). From [82, p. 40],
lim
T→∞
P
(
Nj < b
√
λT + λT
)
=
1√
2pi
∫ b
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx.
Since b is arbitrary, we can choose b small enough such that lim
T→∞
P
(
Nj < b
√
λT + λT
)
< β. Thus,
if Na = ω
(√
λT
)
, then lim
T→∞
PMD < β for all β > 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (13)
Note that Xp(·) and τp(·) correspond to a renewal process whose inter-arrival pdf is p(x). Let M =
N(1 + ρ1/2). Since ρ1 = √cN and m = Xp
(
τp(N)
1−ρ1
)
−N ,
P
(
m ≥ 
√
N
4c
)
= P
(
m ≥ ρ1N
2
)
= P
(
Xp
(
τp (N)
1− ρ1
)
−N ≥ ρ1N
2
)
,
= P
(
Xp
(
τp (N)
1− ρ1
)
≥ N
(
1 +
ρ1
2
))
= P
(
Xp
(
τp (N)
1− ρ1
)
≥M
)
,
(b)
= P ((1− ρ1) τp (M) ≤ τp (N)) (c)= P
(
(1− ρ1)
M∑
i=1
A
(J)
i ≤
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
)
,
(d)
= P
(
(1− ρ1)
M∑
i=N+1
A
(J)
i ≤ ρ1
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
)
, (27)
= P
(
M∑
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M −N ≤
ρ1N
(M −N)(1− ρ1)
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
)
,
(e)
= P (CN) ≥ P (CN |DN)P (DN) . (28)
where (b) follows from (2), A(J)1 , A
(J)
2 , . . . are the IPDs of Jack’s transmitted stream, (c) is true
since (1) is true, (d) follows from removing the common summands, (e) follows from defining CN ={∑M
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M−N ≤ ρ1N(M−N)(1−ρ1)
∑N
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
}
, and the last step follows from the law of total probability
with DN =
{
ρ1N
(M−N)(1−ρ1) ≤ 4
}
. Since M = N
(
1 + ρ1
2
)
and ρ1 = √cN ,
lim
N→∞
P (DN) = lim
N→∞
P
(
ρ1N
(M −N)(1− ρ1) ≤ 4
)
= lim
N→∞
P
(
2
1− ρ1 ≤ 4
)
= 1. (29)
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By (28) and (29),
lim
N→∞
P
(
m ≥ 
√
N
4c
)
≥ lim
N→∞
P (CN |DN) ≥ lim
N→∞
P
(
M∑
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M −N ≤ 4
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
)
= 1. (30)
where the last step is true since the WLLN yields
∑M
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M−N
P−→ λ−1, −4∑Ni=1 A(J)iN P−→ −4λ−1, and
thus
∑M
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M−N − 4
∑N
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
P−→ −3λ−1, as N →∞1. Hence, the proof is complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (14)
The argument follows analogously to that of (13). If A(J)1 , A
(J)
2 , . . . are the IPDs of Jack’s transmitted
stream and M ′ = N(1 + 2ρ1), then:
P
(
m ≤ 
√
4N
c
)
= P
(
M ′∑
i=N+1
Ai
M ′ −N ≥
ρ1N
(M ′ −N)(1− ρ1)
N∑
i=1
Ai
N
)
= P
(
M ′∑
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M ′ −N ≥
1
2
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
)
,
where the last step is true since ρ1N
(M ′−N)(1−ρ1) =
1
2(1−ρ1) ≥ 12 . Then, similar to the arguments that leads
to (30), we can show that
lim
N→∞
P
(
M ′∑
i=N+1
A
(J)
i
M ′ −N ≥
1
2
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
)
= 1.
Thus, (14) is proved.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF (18)
From [Ch. 2.6] [80], c is the Fisher information which is given by
c =
∫ ∞
x=0
p(x)
1
p(x)2
(
∂p−(x, ρ1)
∂ρ1
∣∣∣∣
ρ1=0
)2
dx. (31)
Since p−(x, ρ1) = (1− ρ1)p(x(1− ρ1)),
∂p−(x, ρ1)
∂ρ1
∣∣∣∣
ρ1=0
=
∂ ((1− ρ1) p ((1− ρ1)x))
∂ρ1
∣∣∣∣
ρ1=0
= −p(x)− xdp(x)
dx
. (32)
Therefore, (31) yields
c =
∫ ∞
x=0
p(x) + 2x
dp(x)
dx
+
x2
p(x)
(
dp(x)
dx
)2
dx = 1 +
∫ ∞
x=0
2x
dp(x)
dx
+
x2
p(x)
(
dp(x)
dx
)2
dx. (33)
1If YN
P−→ Y and ZN P−→ Z, then YN + ZN P−→ Y + Z for any sequences of random variables YN and ZN ( [83, prob. 5 p. 262]).
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Taking integral of the both sides of (32) yields∫ ∞
x=0
(
p(x) + x
dp(x)
dx
)
dx = −
∫ ∞
x=0
∂p−(x, ρ1)
∂ρ1
∣∣∣
ρ1=0
dx = 0,
where the last step is true because of the regulatory condition (12). Consequently,∫ ∞
x=0
x
dp(x)
dx
dx = −
∫ ∞
x=0
p(x)dx = −1. (34)
By (34), (33) yields
c = −1 +
∫ ∞
x=0
x2
p(x)
(
dp(x)
dx
)2
dx = −1 +
∫ ∞
x=0
p(x)x2
(
d log p(x)
dx
)2
dx.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The total number of (Alice’s and Jack’s) packets that Alice transmits is Naj = Na +N −m, where
Na is the number of Alice’s packets inserted into the channel, N is the number packets transmitted by
Jack, and m is the number of packets in Alice’s buffer when Alice’s scheme ends. If f(N) = ω(1),
then:
P (Na ≥ f(N)) = P (Naj ≥ f(N) +N −m) . (35)
Let Xp+(t) be the total number of packets transmitted by Alice within the interval [0, t], and τp+(i) be
the time of arrival of the ith packet transmitted by Alice. Note that Xp+(·) and τp+(·) correspond to a
renewal process whose inter-arrival pdf is p+(x, ρ4) =
p(x/(1−ρ4))
1−ρ4 . Also, recall that τp(i) is the time of
arrival of the ith packet transmitted by Jack. Since Jack transmits N packets in a time interval of length
τp (N), and Alice uses this time to transmit Naj packets, Naj = Xp+ (τp (N)). By (35),
P (Na ≥ f(N)) = P (Naj ≥ f(N) +N −m) = P (Xp+ (τp (N)) ≥ f(N) +N −m) ,
= P (τp (N) ≤ τp+ (f(N) +N −m)) , (36)
where the last step is true since (2) is true. Note that τp (N) =
∑N
i=1A
(J)
i , where A
(J)
i s are samples
of p(x), and τp+ (f(N) +N −m) =
∑f(N)+N−m
i=1 A
(A)
i , where A
(A)
1 s are samples of p1(x, ρ4). Let
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Ci =
A
(A)
i
1−ρ4 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Therefore, C1, C2, · · · are samples of p(x). By (36)
P (Na ≥ f(N)) = P
 N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i ≥
f(N)+N−m∑
i=1
A
(A)
i
 = P
 N∑
i=1
A
(A)
i ≥ (1− ρ4)
f(N)+N−m∑
i=1
Ci
 = P (HN) ,
(37)
where
HN =
 1N
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i ≥
(1− ρ4) (f(N) +N −m)
N
f(N)+N−m∑
i=1
Ci
f(N) +N −m
 . (38)
Let IN =
{
1
f(N)+N−m
∑f(N)+N−m
i=1 Ci ≥ λ−1
}
. The law of total probability yields
P (Na ≥ f(N)) = P (HN) = P (Hn|In)P (In) + P
(Hn|IN)P (IN) . (39)
Consider P(IN). Since N −m > 0 and f(N) = ω(1), f(N) + N −m → ∞ as N → ∞. Note that
E[Ci] = λ
−1 and thus the CLT yields lim
N→∞
P (In) = 12 . By (39),
P (Na ≥ f(N)) = 1
2
P (Hn|In) + 1
2
P
(Hn|IN) ≤ 1
2
P (Hn|In) + 1
2
. (40)
Consider P (Hn|In),
P(HN |IN) ≤ P
(
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
≥ (N + f(N)−m)(1− ρ4)
N
λ−1
∣∣∣∣∣IN
)
,
= P
(
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i
N
≥ N + f(N)−m
N
(1− ρ4)λ−1
)
,
= P
(
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i − λ−1√
Nλ
≥ (f(N)−m)(1− ρ4)√
N
− ρ4
√
N
)
.
By (23), ρ4
√
N = c′. Therefore,
P(HN |IN) = P
(
N∑
i=1
A
(J)
i − λ−1√
Nλ
≥ f(N)−m√
N
− c′f(N)−m
N
− c′
)
.
By the CLT, limN→∞ P(HN |IN) = κ where 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. If 0 ≤ κ < 1, (40) yields P (Na ≥ f(N)) < 1.
The value κ = 1 is achievable only if f(N) − m = −ω(√N). Intuitively, m = O(√N) and thus
κ = 1 requires f(N) = O(√N) − ω(√N) < 0. Consequently, there is no f(N) = ω(1) such that
lim
N→∞
P (Na ≥ f(N)) = 1. 
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